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1. Introduction
Human capital is by many perceived as the main economic thrust in creating wealth and
growth. Yet, investments in human capital is no trivial matter. Firms may shun devoting
resources towards an asset as elusive as an employee, and workers themselves may lack
the funding, access to credit, or even the possibility to invest without the consent of their
employer. Despite this, a range of empirical studies document that firms do invest in the
skills of their employees, and that the costs of such investments are borne by the employer,
and not by the worker. So why do firms train?
This paper argues that a worker’s mobility plays a key role in shaping the provision of
contracts and, ultimately, the amount of training observed. More precisely, match-specific
components which restricts a worker’s mobility limit renegotiations and permit firms to
extract ex post quasi -rents.1 Competitive forces drive excess profits to zero, equating ex post
rents with ex ante costs. As a consequence, the cost associated with the equilibrium level
of training stands in direct parity with expected quasi-rents, which, themselves, intimately
relate to the limitations to mobility. In marked contrast to previous studies, this result
does not rely on complementarities between mobility-frictions and human capital, ruling
out wage-compression as the main motivating factor.
In an extension of the model I explore the implications of tuition reimbursement pro-
grams on training, and show that investments in general human capital attains the social
optimum under a wide range of circumstances. Yet, firms ability to write contracts remains
imperative. While reimbursement programs do induce a compressed wage structure, ex post
wage-bargaining often falls short of providing the correct incentives to provide any positive
level of training. Thus, under the hypotheses laid out in this paper, wage-compression is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to encourage firm-sponsored investments in
general training.
In a seminal study, Becker (1964) drew a sharp distinction between general and firm-
specific human capital. General skills are defined as those which are equally useful inside
and outside an employment relation. Specific skills are, on the other hand, only useful
within the context of the current job. Becker argued that in a competitive market, workers
can seamlessly transition across employers, ensuring that wages, at a minimum, reflect
their outside marginal product. The worker therefore becomes the sole residual claimant to
any investments in general skills, mercilessly compromising a firm’s willingness to provide
the necessary training. With firm-specific human capital, however, the story is, at least
1It is important to be precise here. The concepts ex post and ex ante are used relative to the event of
training. For instance, “ex post quasi rents” refers to the rents accruing to the employer after training has
been completed and paid for, while “ex ante costs” refers to the cost of providing the training.
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partially, reversed. Firms, and not workers, are likely to lay any residual claims, and will
therefore also devotedly provide the required funds (Hashimoto, 1981). Casual observations
largely confirm Becker’s propositions. Workers optimally invest in their own general skills
through schooling, while firms provide firm-specific human capital by means of on-the-job
training. As both agents’ incentives are aligned with societal preferences, Becker concluded
that training is efficient.
These predictions have not, however, gone by unchallenged. Workers may, for instance,
face borrowing constraints or other institutional restrictions questioning the extent to which
they can efficiently invest in schooling. Training is moreover often an intangible process of
mentoring, learning by doing, advice and practice, largely beyond the control of the em-
ployee herself. Indeed, a recent empirical literature has shown that firms, and not workers,
commonly do provide and pay for investments in general training, casting doubt on some
of the literature’s initial conclusions.
Using survey data, Barron et al. (1997) and Bishop (1996) show that on-the-job training
often displays a very general nature, and is commonly paid for by the employer. Productivity
rises much faster with respect to training than do wages – at a factor of around ten –
suggesting that firms may reap large rewards investing in a worker’s skills.2 Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1998) find that in more than 40% of cases, firms pay for the explicit costs involved
in off-site training – such as at business schools or vocational institutes – which is almost
surely of a general character. Wage-growth, on the other hand, appears largely unaffected,
suggesting that firms both pay for, and benefit from, investment in general human capital.
Interestingly, the wage-growth associated with training provided by previous employers is
much larger, giving further support to the general nature of acquired skills.3 Another
lucid example stems from the German apprenticeship system (see, for instance, Harhoff
and Kane (1995) and Franz and Soskice (1995)). Under this system, firms voluntarily offer
apprenticeships to young workers which then undergoes extensive training. An apprentice’s
skills are verified by external boards upon completion, indicating a substantial general
component. Although apprentices normally receive lower wages than fully trained workers,
the net-cost of apprenticeships is consistently estimated to be strictly positive (e.g. Soskice
(1994), Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b)). Despite this, apprentices are under no contractual
obligation to remain with the firm providing training, exposing firms to the vulnerable
situation initially suggested by Becker. So why do firms engage in such investments?
2Bishop (1991) and Barron et al. (1989) reaches similar conclusions.
3Booth and Bryan (2005) and Blundell et al. (1996) find similar results in the United Kingdom, Gerfin
(2004) in Switzerland and Goux and Maurin (2000) in France.
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This paper argues that the presence contracts together with frictional job-to-job tran-
sitions provide a fertile ground for firm-sponsored investments in general training. To
illustrate this idea, it is instructive to think of a contract simply as a wage agreed upon
at the onset of a relationship. Because the worker is not contractually tied to her em-
ployer, the contract may be renegotiated as the worker may otherwise threaten to leave.
Renegotiations, however, can only occur by mutual consent, ensuring that any reformulated
agreement matches, but never exceeds, a worker’s outside option.4 As a consequence, if
renegotiations do occur, any additional marginal increase in training will be fully reflected
in wages, leaving the worker, but not the firm, the full residual claimant. But more im-
portantly, however, if renegotiations do not occur, the situation is instead the reverse. The
firm, but not the worker, will reap the full marginal benefit associated with the additional
provision of training. Evidently, a profit-seeking firm will find it optimal to invest in a
worker’s skills to the point of renegotiation, but never beyond.5
If training is of a perfectly general nature, a worker’s outside option is equal to her
marginal product less some cost of transition.6 As an optimal provision of training infers
that wages equal outside options, a firm’s quasi-rent must exactly coincide with a worker’s
mobility cost. Ex ante costs, however, relate to the precise level of training, which in turn
depends on the contract itself. A more generous contract yields more training, higher ex
ante costs, and therefore lower total rents, and vice versa. An equilibrium contract must
therefore induce a training-level such that the cost associated with its provision exactly
equals the quasi-rents later accrued. I show that there exists a unique contract satisfying
these properties. The poaching externality suggested by Becker can largely be internalized.
In an influential study, Acemoglu (1997) argues that the Beckerian poaching externality
may not be the only source of market-failure plaguing an efficient provision of human
capital. The mere possibility of exogenous separations may impede training further, as
future firms would then reap the rewards of investments made by past employers. The
argument applies quite forcefully to the preceding analysis: Even if wages were never to
be renegotiated, exogenous separations instill a wedge between the (expected) private and
societal residual gains, impairing a firm’s willingness to train. Yet I show that if contracts
assume the more complex role of a value, rather than just a wage, all externalities may
be internalized. To appreciate this, notice that whereas a firm’s expected private gain to
training is reduced by the probability of separation, the worker’s private gain is improved
by the precise same amount; what the firm expects to forgo, the worker expects to retain.
4This particular form of renegotiation is commonly known as the outside option principle and is further
discussed in Section 2, on page 7. See MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) for a more advanced discussion.
5Or, if contracts are sufficiently generous, a firm will train to the socially optimal level, but not beyond.
6More generally, less of some relation-specific component to the joint surplus.
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General training therefore turns into an attractive component of an optimal compensation
package. A marginal increase in training improves a worker’s job-satisfaction and ultimately
allows the firm to marginally lower wages while still remaining equally competitive in the
market for labor. Of course, inasmuch a value more resembles an expectation than a
formal contract, it is unclear whether a market economy may sustain such a reputational
equilibrium. If firms are sufficiently patient, I show that it can.
In a sequence of papers, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998; 1999a; 1999b) seek to explain the
possible motives underpinning the empirically observed pattern of training. While they do
consider the consequences of labor mobility costs, their conclusions are diametrically differ-
ent from mine. Mobility costs establish a wedge between a worker’s marginal product and
her outside option giving rise to a situation of bilateral monopoly. Although firms may, in
this case, extract some rents from their employees, Acemoglu and Pischke forcefully argue
that such frictions are unable to improve firms’ incentives to provide training.7 If mobility
costs are fundamentally unrelated to skills, so are rents, and the marginal cost to training
exceeds the marginal benefit even at very low levels of human capital. Instead, Acemoglu
and Pischke assert that a worker’s marginal product must rise faster with training than
her outside wage in order to provide firms with the right incentives to invest. The under-
lying wage-compression, they conclude, is both necessary and sufficient for firm-sponsored
training, an assertion markedly in contrast with the ideas developed in this paper.
Acemoglu and Pischke provide a battery of explanations which may potentially under-
pin a compressed wage structure. Following Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang
(1996), and later Autor (2001) and Malcomson et al. (2003), they show that asymmetric
information with respect to skills or training may lead to a distorted external wage struc-
ture.8 Efficiency wages and/or union wage-setting provide alternative foundations, and may
therefore also encourage firms to invest in an employee’s general skills. And lastly, search
frictions may plausibly have a similar effect on workers’ outside opportunities, on wages, and
therefore, ultimately, on training. Interestingly, Acemoglu and Pischke further contend the
common-held view that access to firm-specific human capital may suppress investments in
general skills, as firms’ residual benefits are more favorably inclined to the former. Instead,
they argue that if (and only if) firm-specific and general human capital are complementary
7For instance, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a), p. 549, note that “/. . ./ is not the attachment between
firms and workers that leads to firm-sponsored training”.
8Asymmetric information may generate a distorted wage structure if skills and human capital are comple-
ments in production, but not otherwise. Furthermore, Autor (2001) provide a slightly differentiated analysis
compared to others. In particular, Autor consider the training-phase an opportunity for a firm to dissolve
the informational asymmetries.
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in production, investments in firm-specific skills compress the external wage structure, and
therefore encourages more – and not less – investments in general training.
I further analyze the equilibrium outcome of training under the more challenging premise
in which firm-specific and general human capital are perfectly substitutable. While the
social optimum prescribes zero investments in specific skills and positive investments in
general skills, the framework of Acemoglu and Pischke predicts the precise opposite.9 In
contrast, I show that under the hypotheses laid out in the present study, aforementioned
results remain valid, with little modification. As previously, firms optimally invest in a
worker’s general skills, equating the cost of training with expected quasi-rents. Quasi-
rents, however, are now generally larger as even a small investment in firm-specific human
capital magnifies any costs to transition, and therefore creates further room for investments
in general training. While substitutes in production, general and firm-specific skills are
complementary from a strategic point of view. Mobility costs again amplify the provision
of training further, but they are by no means necessary.
In the latter part of the analysis, I consider the implications of tuition reimbursement
programs on firm-sponsored training. Employer provided tuition reimbursements is a wide-
spread program in which firms provide financial assistance for the direct cost of coursework
taken by employees.10 As training is conducted at accredited academic institutions, there
is little doubt on the general nature of acquired skills. Participation in training programs,
however, is commonly subjected to repayment clauses, which stipulate reimbursement of
incurred training costs if the worker were to separate before some contracted minimum ser-
vice period. As an increase in training directly translates to a larger separation repayment,
the external wage structure – i.e. the worker’s threat point – is tightly compressed. Yet,
absent of contracts, the resulting compression fails to provide firms with the right incentives
to train.11 An increase in training increases separation repayments, and therefore also raises
a firm’s quasi-rents. By cause of bargaining, however, the increase in expected quasi-rents
is likely to fall short of the associated increase in separation repayments, which – at the
very most – equals the marginal cost. Thus, while investments in training does engender an
increase in firms’ quasi-rents, the marginal gain of such policy is unlikely to exceed the mar-
ginal cost, even at zero levels of training. In contrast, the equilibrium contracts analyzed
here yields Pareto-optimal investments in training under a wide range of circumstances,
including the situation in which there are no (exogenous) mobility costs at all.
9In Acemoglu and Pischke’s framework, if the two types of human capital are perfectly substitutable, the
market outcome predicts zero investments in general skills, and positive investments in firm-specific skills.
10Capelli (2004) estimate that up to 85% of firms offer some form of tuition reimbursement program.
11Or, equivalently, no tuition reimbursement programs would be offered.
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2. Model
The economy is populated by a large number of potential firms, and a unit-measure of
workers. Workers live for one period, after which they are replaced by a new cohort of equal
size. Firms, on the other hand, may live for perpetuity, and survive from one period to the
next with probability β ∈ [0, 1).12 Both workers and firms are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In each period, a firm will decide whether to assume the role of a training-firm or of a
poacher. There is no cost associated with the choice of characteristics, and any decision is
perfectly reversible in future periods. A training-firm may offer a worker training, τ , before
she enters her productive period. Undergoing training instills no disamenity per se, and is
therefore always accepted. Training improves a worker’s marginal product according to the
function f(τ), but it also comes at cost c(τ). Functions f and c are assumed to be strictly
increasing, strictly concave, with c(0) = 0. The socially optimal level of training, τ∗, is
assumed to be strictly positive and is defined by τ∗ := argmax{f(τ)− c(τ)}.13
In contrast to a training-firm, a poaching-firm does not offer any investments in human
capital. Instead they aim to attract previously trained workers right before their productive
period. As employment is formed and sustained on an at-will basis, a worker may legally
leave her current employer if she finds a poacher’s offer more favorable. The general nature
of training ensures that a worker’s marginal product remains intact. However, by separating
from her current employer, a worker will incur cost ∆ ≥ 0, irrespective of her level of human
capital, τ .14 A successful poach must therefore always entail a wage which exceeds the value
of staying by, at least, this cost of transition. The mobility cost, ∆, may have a very broad
interpretation. It could represent the disutility, spousal constraint, or monetary cost of
relocating. But as we shall see, it could also represent some match-specific component of
productivity – e.g. firm-specific human capital – which is then lost at transition.
With probability q ∈ [0, 1) a worker and her training-firm will separate regardless of
a poacher’s offer. Separation occurs before the worker’s productive period, but after the
training-phase. The training-firm then immediately turns into a poaching-firm, and becomes
matched with a new, separated, worker. Analogously, the worker immediately teams-up
with a new poaching-firm. As in Acemoglu (1997), the underlying shock to the relationship
is thought to parsimoniously capture the idea of a separation externality, in which future
12The survival-rate β may of course also double as a discount factor. Or more generally, β may represent
the product between some exogenous survival-rate, λ < 1, and discount factor, δ, such that β = λ× δ. But
none of these details are important for the analysis.
13Sufficient conditions to ensure τ∗ > 0 are that f and c are differentiable and that f ′(0) > 0,
limτ→∞ c′(τ) =∞, and c′(0) = 0.
14It should be noticed that this is a substantial departure from the studies of Acemoglu and Pischke, in
which ∆ is positively related to τ .
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employers benefit from past employers’ training decisions. If the shock, for instance, is
thought to represent a sudden drop in demand for a firm’s products, separations are ex
post efficient, but will still entail distortionary effects on ex ante training decisions.
Lastly, as neither firms nor workers are contractually tied to the partnership, renegotia-
tions may arise. Any previously agreed contract is, nevertheless, enforceable as long as trade
does take place, and renegotiation can therefore only occur by mutual consent (MacLeod
and Malcomson, 1993). Renegotiation by mutual consent observes two important prop-
erties. First, if trade under the current contract is mutually beneficial, renegotiation will
never arise. Second, whenever renegotiation does arise, any reformulated agreement exactly
matches, but never exceeds, an agent’s outside offer.15
The argument can be made simple. Suppose that post training, the firm suggests a new
revised wage-contract to the worker.16 The worker can either accept or reject the offer, or
leave the firm in favor for some outside opportunity (i.e. a poacher). If the offer is rejected,
trade will materialize under the previously agreed contract. If it is accepted, trade will
instead take place under the newly suggested contract. Lastly, if the worker leaves, the
partnership is terminated. Clearly, any offer yielding a lower value to the worker than that
associated with the current contract will be rejected. Any offer falling short of an outside
option will terminate the match. And any offer above the current contract and the outside
option will be suboptimal from the firm’s perspective. As a consequence, a firm will either
propose to leave the current contract intact, or suggest a reformulated agreement which
exactly matches, but does not exceed, the worker’s outside offer.
Now, given such a renegotiated contract, suppose the worker has the opportunity to
suggest yet another revision. Any value lower than the previously revised contract is of
course sub-optimal from the worker’s perspective, and will therefore never be suggested.
And any higher value will always be rejected by the firm. As a consequence, the firm’s
initial revision – if any – will prevail and ultimately dictate the terms of trade.17
The within period time-line of events is illustrated in Figure 1. In the beginning of the
period, the firm and the worker sign a contract. Uncertainty is resolved after the training-
phase, at which the partnership is liquidated with probability q. With the complementary
probability 1−q, however, the partnership remains intact, but the prospect of poaching may
15This property is commonly known as “the outside option principle” (see e.g. Binmore et al. (1989) or
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)).
16Notice that as renegotiation occurs after the training-phase and after uncertainty is resolved, the
relevant part of the contract that may be renegotiated is simply the wage.
17MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) studies a more intricate version of this renegotiation game, in which
the proposer is randomly drawn on multiple occasions. As the length of each time-interval approaches zero,
the firm will eventually become the proposer with probability one, and the result follows.
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Figure 1. Time-line of events.
still engender voluntary quits, and therefore also renegotiations. In any event, the worker
reaches her productive phase in the latter part of the period, and the monetary transaction
is executed.
2.1. Equilibrium. A potential firm opens up a vacancy at cost k ≥ 0, irrespective of her
subsequent choice of characteristic. The cost k may denote the actual cost of posting a
vacancy, but it could also represent the returns to some unmodeled factor of production
such as physical capital, entrepreneurial returns, or the cost of management. There are no
matching frictions, and as long as a firm subscribes to the going market price for labor,
V , her vacancy will be filled immediately and with probability one. Training-firms are,
therefore, price takers. Poachers, on the other hand, are by definition uninterested in filling
a vacancy immediately. Instead, they attempt to headhunt workers after the training-phase
by outbidding incumbent employers by at least ∆.
Before formally defining a competitive equilibrium, it is instructive to discuss some of its
more relevant implications. An equilibrium implies that the demand for labor – i.e. the
number of active firms – equals the supply of labor, which, by assumption, is of measure
one. As a fraction, 1 − β, of firms exogenously exit each period, a corresponding measure
of firms must enter in order to (intertemporally) sustain an equilibrium. Obviously, if the
expected net present value profits exceed the up-front cost k, the measure of active firms
will be ever expanding. Conversely, if the aforementioned profits fall short of the cost k, the
measure of active firms will be ever declining. If, and only if, ex ante profits precisely equal
the entry cost k, the measure of active firms – or labor demand – is left undetermined, and
will therefore, in equilibrium, equal labor supply.
If we for the moment assume that an equilibrium exists in periods t + 1 onwards, a
(successful) poacher’s profits in period t must equal
pi = f(τ)− w + βk (1)
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where f(τ) denotes the worker’s marginal product, w the wage, and k the continuation
profits in period t + 1. If a poacher could successfully attract a worker at wage w <
f(τ) − (1 − β)k, profits, pi, would exceed k, and the measure of active poachers would be
ever expanding. Bertrand competition would immediately put upward pressure on wages
until w = f(τ) − (1 − β)k, ensuring that pi = k. Conversely, no poacher would ever
offer a wage w > f(τ) − (1 − β)k, as profits would fall short of k. There would be no
endogenous entry of poachers, and the remaining – and exogenously determined – measure
of poaching-firms, q, would be matched by an exogenously laid off worker even at some
wage w ≤ f(τ) − (1 − β)k.18 As a consequence, the only poaching wage prevailing in
equilibrium is given by w = f(τ) − (1 − β)k, which ensures that operation-profits exactly
matches any upfront costs. As a final remark, it should be noted that a training-firm always
finds it profitable to renegotiate and match a poacher’s offer, were it to exceed the initially
agreed contract.19 As a consequence, the equilibrium will not observe any voluntary – or
endogenous – separations.
The market price for labor, V , takes the form of a value. More precisely, with a slight
abuse of notation, let w denote the wage paid at a training-firm. A worker’s evaluation of
the value of employment is then given by
V = (1− q)w + q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (2)
That is, with probability 1− q, the relationship is left intact and the worker may enjoy the
wage w. With the complementary probability q, however, the relationship is terminated
and she will instead team-up with a poacher and receive utility f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆.
Conditional on having entered the market, a training-firm’s problem can now be formu-
lated as
pi(V ) = max
w,τ≥0
{(1− q)(f(τ)− w + βk)− c(τ) + qk} (3)
s.t. V ≤ (1− q)w + q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (4)
w ≥ f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆ (5)
Equation (3) represents a firm’s expected net present value profits. The first term captures
revenues and costs accruing under the hypothesis that no separation occurs. It includes the
worker’s marginal product f(τ), her wage w, and discounted expected continuation profits
βk, respectively. With probability q, however, the firm and the worker separate, and the
18It should be noted that search, in this case, is assumed to be undirected.
19Notice that a training-firm’s profits after the training-phase equals at least k if a poacher’s offer is
matched, and only βk is the worker is lost to the poacher.
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firm – assuming the role of a poacher – is assured profits k. In any event, the firm has to
pay the full training cost c(τ).
Equation (4) is the “promise-keeping constraint” which ensures that the firm will not
renege on delivering the value specified by the contract, V . Of course, inasmuch as training,
and maybe also wages, are difficult to verify by some third party (a court), commitment
issues may arise. These concerns will be addressed in Section 3.1.
Lastly, equation (5) guarantees that wages are renegotiation-proof. Permitting workers
to renegotiate wages, or allowing firms to optimally set wages that never are, are entirely
isomorphic in this setting. The latter formulation, however, yields slightly simpler notation
and a more straightforward analysis.
It is worth emphasizing here that the parameter ∆ need not to denote a mobility cost
per se, nor must it specifically be levied on the worker. Indeed, ∆ may more generally
represent some firm- or match-specific component to productivity which is then lost in case
of separation.
The definition of a competitive equilibrium is now straightforward.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a contract V , a training level τ , and a wage w,
such that,
(i) Given V , τ and w solve the firm’s problem in (3)-(5).
(ii) Firms make profit k. That is, pi(V ) = k.
3. Results
Given the definition of a competitive equilibrium, we are now ready to state the paper’s
main proposition.
Proposition 1. There exist a unique equilibrium with training satisfying,
(i) c(τ) = (1− q)∆ if c(τ∗) ≥ (1− q)∆,
(ii) and τ = τ∗ if c(τ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆
Proof. Rearranging constraint (4) yields
(1− q)w ≥ V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
Conditional on a certain choice of τ , a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal wage-
setting is therefore given by
(1− q)w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆} − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (6)
As a consequence, the objective function is strictly increasing on τ ∈ [0,min{τ¯ , τ∗}) – where
τ¯ is defined as V = f(τ¯)−(1−β)k−∆ – and strictly decreasing thereafter. Optimal training
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is therefore given by min{τ¯ , τ∗}. Optimal wage-setting combined with the optimal choice
of training reveals that wages satisfy
(1− q)w = V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
In equilibrium, however, firms make profits k, and V must therefore satisfy
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆ (7)
That is, the optimal level of training depends on the contract, V , and the equilibrium level
of V depend on the optimal level of training.
Inserting the equilibrium V in equation (7) into the wage-setting equation (6) yields
(1− q)w = max{f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆}
− q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
Combining the equation above with the optimal choice of training implies that if c(τ∗) ≥
(1− q)∆, the unique equilibrium is given by c(τ) = (1− q)∆. And if c(τ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆, the
unique equilibrium is given by τ = τ∗. 
The details of the proof are quite involved and best understood algebraically, but the logic
is straightforward. Suppose for simplicity that both k and q equals zero. That is, there is no
uncertainty and the equilibrium entails that firms make zero profits. A contract, V , is then
simply an agreed wage. As a consequence, a firm may seize all residual gains associated
with training up until the point of renegotiation, but none thereafter. The optimal choice
of training is therefore given by min{τ∗, τ¯}, where τ∗ denotes the social optimum, and τ¯ the
level of training at which renegotiation is imminent.20 The optimal wage, in turn, is given
by the contract V itself, as either τ = τ∗ – and no renegotiation occurs – or τ = τ¯ , at which
V = f(τ¯)−∆ and renegotiations are imminent. Of course, inasmuch as the renegotiation-
point of training, τ¯ , depends on the contract, V , so does also the optimal choice of training.
But whereas training relates to contracts, zero profits infer that an equilibrium contract
itself relates to training. More precisely, after the training-phase, firms earn quasi-rents
f(τ) − V . Total rents, or expected profits, are given by f(τ) − c(τ) − V . Hence, an
equilibrium contract must satisfy V = f(τ)− c(τ).
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between contracts and training at two different levels
of the mobility cost. Consider first the graph to the left. The monotonically increasing curve
marked as f(τ¯)−∆ traces out the renegotiation-point, τ¯ , as a function of the contract, V .
Again, for a certain contract, the optimal choice of training is given by min{τ¯ , τ∗}. The
other curve, the parabola marked f(τ)− c(τ), illustrates instead the contract which ensures
20For a given V , τ¯ is in this case defined by V = f(τ¯)−∆.
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Figure 2. The relationship between contracts and training.
zero profits at various values of τ . By the assumptions on f and c, there exist a unique
intersection-point at which V = V¯ and τ = c−1(∆). That is, at the contract V¯ , the optimal
choice of training is given by the renegotiation-point τ¯ = c−1(∆), as τ¯ < τ∗. And at
training-level c−1(∆), the contract V¯ ensures zero profits. As a consequence, the contract
V¯ is the unique equilibrium contract, and τ¯ = c−1(∆) is the unique equilibrium level of
training.
The distinct relationship between the equilibrium level of training and the mobility cost,
∆, is also easily understood in the current context. As τ¯ is strictly below τ∗, renegotiation
is imminent, and V¯ = f(τ¯)−∆. The firm’s ex post quasi-rents are therefore simply given
by the cost ∆.21 As firms make zero profits under contract V¯ , the cost of training, c(τ¯),
must equal the quasi-rent ∆, and τ¯ = c−1(∆) follows.
The graph on the right of Figure 2 illustrates the same aforementioned relationships but
at the larger mobility cost ∆′. For a given level of V , a larger cost to mobility raises the
renegotiation-point, expands the scope for training, and shifts the curve f(τ¯) − ∆′ to the
right. At the contract V ∗, the renegotiation point of training, τ¯ , widely exceeds the social
optimum, τ∗, which therefore coincides with a firm’s preferred investment level. Of course,
as V ∗ is defined as f(τ∗) − c(τ∗), firms make zero profits, and the equilibrium level of
training corresponds to the social optimum.
As a final remark, it should be noted that assuming zero profits is largely innocuous
from the perspective of illustrating the equilibrium, but abstracting from uncertainty is
not. Whenever q is positive, the equilibrium displays exogenous separations at which future
employers benefit from past employers’ training decisions, and contracts assume the more
21Recall that, in this case, a firm’s quasi-rents are defined as f(τ)− V . Hence f(τ¯)− V¯ = ∆.
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elaborate role of a value, rather than just a wage. To better understand the implications
of such exogenous separations, let us for the moment ignore constraints (4) and (5). The
first-order condition of the firm’s objective function with respect to training is then given
by
(1− q)f ′(τˆ∗) = c′(τˆ∗) (8)
where τˆ∗ denotes the, for lack of a better word, constrained efficient level of training.22
Thus, even in the absence of the poaching externality, the separation externality imposes a
wedge between the private and societal returns to training, casting prima facie doubt on
the efficiency of the equilibrium. Despite this, Proposition 1 reveals that such concerns are
unnecessary. To understand why, combining constraints (4) and (5) reveals that optimal
wage-setting observes
(1− q)w = max{V, f(τ)−∆} − q(f(τ)−∆)
Thus, under the hypothesis that renegotiation is not (locally) an imminent threat – i.e.
that V > f(τ)−∆ at some τ – wages are actually decreasing in training. As investments in
general human capital improves a worker’s situation in case of separation, it also improves
her job-satisfaction, and therefore permit firms to lower wages while still remaining an
attractive and competitive employer. A marginal increase in training therefore yields a
direct benefit by raising an employee’s expected marginal product by (1 − q)f ′(τ), but it
also yields an indirect benefit of marginally lowering wages by qf ′(τ). The total marginal
benefit is therefore f ′(τ), and the separation externality can be internalized. Investments
in general human capital constitute an attractive component of an optimal compensation
package.
However, while the separation externality can be internalized from a marginalist per-
spective, Proposition 1 reveals that it does impair training at sufficiently low levels of ∆.
Why? When renegotiation is imminent, notice that a firm’s ex post quasi-rent still remains
equal to ∆. Expected quasi-rents, however, equal only (1− q)∆. As a consequence, training
satisfies c−1(∆(1 − q)) if c(τ∗) ≥ (1 − q)∆, and coincides with the social optimum only if
c(τ∗) ≤ (1 − q)∆. Therefore, and as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a), higher turnover
reduces training, in as much as they reduce the expected quasi-rents.
3.1. Reputations. The previous section studied a model in which firms can commit both
to training and wages. While it appears reasonable that a court is able to verify and
enforce contracts which stipulate a monetary transaction, the more elusive nature of training
22For illustrational purposes it is here assumed that f and c are differentiable functions. If they are not,
the constrained efficient level of training is defined as τˆ∗ := argmax{(1− q)f(τ)− c(τ)}
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raises some further challenges. In particular, as training commonly involves the highly
intangible (and unverifiable) process of mentoring, learning by doing, advice and practice,
past commitments may be honored only through participants voluntary actions, or perhaps
not at all.
This section will address these concerns. First, under the hypothesis that no firm can, nor
will, commit to training, I examine to which extent investments in general human capital
can be sustained in equilibrium. As we shall see, training need not to differ markedly from
the previous analysis, but it will neither ever reach the social optimum. Second, I examine
under which conditions firms may voluntarily honor past training commitments, even in the
absence of third party enforcement. If firms are sufficiently “patient”, i.e. β → 1, I show
they will.
If firms are not able, or willing, to honor past training commitments, a contract assumes
the de facto role of a simple wage. That is, constraint (4) in problem (3)-(5), is replaced by
V ≤ w (9)
where V again denotes the contract, and w the resulting, renegotiation-proof, wage. Let τˆ∗
again represent the constrained efficient level of training; i.e. τˆ∗ := argmax{(1 − q)f(τ) −
c(τ)}. Proposition 2 then summarizes the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2. There exist a unique equilibrium with training satisfying,
(i) c(τ) = (1− q)∆ if c(τˆ∗) ≥ (1− q)∆,
(ii) and τ = τˆ∗ if c(τˆ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Thus, in the absence of contracts stipulating both wages as well as human capital invest-
ments, firms may train up until the constrained efficient level, τˆ∗, but never beyond. Shortly
put, the separation externality cannot be internalized. Nevertheless, for a sufficiently small
level of the mobility cost, training under the two contracting regimes coincide exactly, as
the poaching externality – and not the separation externality – is the dominating market
failure, impairing any investments beyond c−1(∆(1− q)) ≤ τˆ∗.
However, whereas firms may renege on unverifiable commitments without legal conse-
quence, there are also reasons to believe that market forces alone can in some circumstances
sustain contractual performance. Following the ideas developed in the seminal work of Klein
and Leﬄer (1981), consider the situation in which courts are unable to verify the intricate
nuances that constitute training, but parties involved in the transaction can. A worker
whose employer has not conformed to the market-anticipated training provision may then
publicly communicate her discontent, permanently tarnishing her employer’s reputation.
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As a consequence, a firm defecting on her training promise may face significant difficulties
attracting future employees, providing strong incentives to honor even unverifiable agree-
ments. I will henceforth refer to such a situation as a reputational equilibrium.
Proposition 3. A reputational equilibrium can be sustained for some β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. In Appendix A. 
To appreciate the proposition, it is important to understand both the gains and losses
associated with defection. A firm that has previously reneged on her training promise
has permanently lost her ability to attract potential employees by committing to a value,
V . Instead, she must offer a wage-contract, wˆ, such that the associated (and rationally)
perceived value of employment equals that of the market.
Suppose that c(τˆ∗) ≥ (1− q)∆. In the equilibrium with commitment, renegotiations are
imminent and wages, w, are thus given by f(τ)−(1−β)k−∆. As a consequence, a firm that
has previously defected on her training promise may well offer the contract wˆ = w, and,
optimally, train τˆ = τ .23 A defected firm behaves therefore no differently from a committed
firm, and reputations are irrelevant. The reason is quite straightforward. As the poaching
externality impedes human capital investments beyond τˆ∗, the separation externality does
not interfere with equilibrium training, rendering contracts which encompass anything in
excess to a simple wage redundant.
However, in the alternative scenario in which c(τˆ∗) < (1− q)∆, equilibrium training with
commitment is instead given by τ > τˆ∗. Any defecting firm offering wˆ = w will therefore
train up until the constrained efficient level, τˆ∗, but not beyond. The perceived value of
employment is given by (1−q)w+q(f(τˆ∗)−(1−β)k−∆), which falls short of the equilibrium
market value, V . As a consequence, a firm that has previously defected would, in this case,
not be able to attract any future employees, and therefore quickly run out of business.
Thus, in order to remain an attractive employer, a firm that has previously defected must
offer a wage wˆ such that
(1− q)wˆ = V − q(f(τˆ∗)− (1− β)k −∆)
ensuring that the perceived value of employment equals that of the market. Clearly, as τˆ∗
falls short of τ , wˆ must exceed w, and a reneging firm will find herself less profitable in the
future than a committed firm.
Nevertheless, while a defecting firm can be sure to make some future losses relative
to a committed firm, reneging on past training-commitments also brings some immediate
23Recall that both w and τ refers to the outcomes in Proposition 1.
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benefits. In particular, the momentary return for a defecting firm equals
(1− q)(f(τˆ∗)− w)− c(τˆ∗) + qk
By the definition of τˆ∗, these returns clearly exceed those of a committed firm, and a
reputational equilibrium can only be sustained if future losses exceed the momentary gains.
Proposition 3 reveals that for a sufficiently large β, they do.
3.2. Firm-Specific Human Capital. The preceding analysis has so far focussed on hu-
man capital provisions encompassing a perfectly general nature. However, it appears obvi-
ous that there exist other forms of human capital which are more useful within a specific
employment relation. Although the existence of a purely firm-specific type of human capital
is to some extent doubtful, this does not, in my view, undermine the usefulness of studying
its theoretical implications.24 For instance, the supply- or value chains of many modern
companies are comprised by several similar and often well-established steps. A worker’s
accumulation of human capital therefore covers industry-, or even economy-wide, compo-
nents such as standardized softwares, machines, and structures – which are all surely of a
general nature. Yet, this organization is not coincidental. A firm could well develop its
very own unique supply chain, effectively constraining the accumulation of human capital
to the firm’s specificity. Thus, the mere fact that purely firm-specific human capital is
rarely observed does not imply that it does not exist within a firm’s choice-set. Indeed, the
very existence of standardized – or “general-intense” – production processes raises the same
questions and challenges as those of firm-sponsored investment in general human capital.
The Beckerian poaching externality appears to be an imminent threat even at this, much
grander, scale.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) explore the consequences of firm-specific human capital
on the provision of general training. They conclude that if and only if both types of capital
are complementary in production, firms find it optimal to – at least partly – invest in a
worker’s general skills. The mechanism is quite direct. As the presence of firm-specific
human capital increases the marginal return to general training, but has no effect on a
worker’s external wage structure, the marginal net benefit of investments is positive and
the result follows. It should be noted, however, that although training is positive under
these assumptions, it does never – under realistic conditions – reach the social optimum.25
24For instance, Abraham and Farber (1987), Topel (1991), and Jacobson et al. (1993) find evidence in
favor of a positive tenure premium, commonly interpreted as firm-specific human capital. However, Altonji
and Shakotko (1987) and Altonji and Williams (2005) cast some doubts on these findings.
25General training reaches the social optimum in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) if and only if a worker’s
external wage-structure is entirely independent of general human capital. In the current setting, if both
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Suppose that a firm in the current framework has access to two types of human capital,
τ and s. As previously, τ denotes perfectly general human capital, while s is entirely firm-
specific, and therefore lost in case of separation. In addition, the two different types of
skills are perfectly substitutable in both production and costs.26 A training-firm’s objective
function is therefore given by
pi(V ) = max
w,τ≥0,s≥0
{(1− q)(f(τ + s)− w + βk)− c(τ + s) + qk} (10)
subject to, again, constraints (4) and (5).27 The Pareto-optimal level of training is given
by τ = τ∗, and with s = 0.
Before stating the main proposition of this section, it is useful to define the unique number
s∗ > 0 as
s∗ := argmaxτ{(1− q)f(τ)− c(τ)} (11)
It should be noted that s∗ takes on the same value as τˆ∗ – the constrained efficient level of
training – defined in the preceding section. Although, as they have very different interpre-
tations, they do not share notation.
Proposition 4. There exist a unique equilibrium with the following properties,
(i) If (1− q)∆ < c(s∗), general training solves (1− q)f(τ)− (1− q)∆ = (1− q)f(s∗)−
c(s∗), and firm-specific training equals s = s∗ − τ .
(ii) If c(τ∗) > (1 − q)∆ ≥ c(s∗), general training solves c(τ) = ∆(1 − q), and firm-
specific training is zero.
(iii) Finally, if c(τ∗) ≤ (1 − q)∆, general training equals τ∗ and firm-specific training
is, again, equal to zero.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
In order to understand the mechanisms underlying the proposition, it is instructive to
derive the optimal choice of firm-specific human capital investments, s, as a function of
general training, τ
s =
argmaxs{(1− q)f(s+ τ)− c(s+ τ)} if τ ≤ s∗;0 elsewhere.
types of human capital are perfect complements – e.g. a Leontief production function – firm’s train to the
Pareto-optimum.
26It should be noted that the assumption of perfect substitutes contrast markedly with previous studies
(e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a), Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann (2006), and Balmaceda (2005)), and effectively
removes the direct link established between firm-specific and general human capital discussed above.
27As s is purely firm-specific, it does not show up in any of the constraints, which remain unaltered.
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That is, as long as τ ≤ s∗, s is set such that the sum τ +s satisfies (11). Clearly, if τ > s∗, s
equals zero as the non-negativity constraint is binding. However, for the very same reasons
as discussed in Section 3, page 13, investments in general skills, τ , are marginally preferred
to specific skills, s. That is, under the hypothesis that renegotiation is not an imminent
threat, the marginal benefit to general training is given by f ′(τ + s), to be compared with
(1−q)f ′(τ+s) for the equivalent (marginal) investments in specific skills. The cost, however,
is the same. Thus, a profit maximizing firm will invest in general skills up until the point of
renegotiation – or to the Pareto-optimal level, whichever comes first – but not beyond. Thus
if τ¯ < s∗, τ = τ¯ and firm-specific investments fills up the remainder such that τ + s = s∗,
but s is otherwise zero.
In the situation at which (1− q)∆ falls short of c(s∗), the equilibrium contract impedes
general training to the extent that τ falls short of s∗. As a consequence, s fills up the
remainder such that s = s∗−τ . Interestingly, general training in the presence of firm-specific
human capital exceeds that of its absence. To appreciate this, notice that (1− q)∆ < c(s∗)
implies (1 − q)∆ < c(τ∗), and that training in the absence of firm-specific human capital
thus solves (1− q)f(τ)− (1− q)∆ = (1− q)f(τ)− c(τ). However, as (1− q)f(s∗)− c(s∗) >
(1− q)f(τ)− c(τ), the result follows. The reason is of course that a positive level of firm-
specific human capital imposes an additional wedge between a worker’s marginal product
and her outside option. As a consequence, the renegotiation point, τ¯ , is higher, leaving
additional room for training in general skills. As an immediate corollary, general training
is positive even in the case in which ∆ is zero.
Whenever (1 − q)∆ falls between the larger c(τ∗) and c(s∗), the equilibrium contract
permits a sufficiently large renegotiation point such that τ ≥ s∗. As a consequence, general
training coincides with the situation in which firm-specific training is absent, and s equals
zero.
Lastly, when (1−q)∆ exceeds c(τ∗), the equilibrium contract again permits a sufficiently
large renegotiation point to the extent that τ = τ∗. As a consequence, investments in both
general- and firm-specific human capital coincides with the social optimum.
3.3. Tuition Reimbursement Programs. Firm-sponsored tuition reimbursement pro-
grams offer financial assistance to employees wishing to undertake coursework in order to
improve their skill-set. Training is usually implemented at accredited academic institutions,
casting little doubt on the generality of acquired skills. However, participation in most pro-
grams are also subjected to repayment clauses, which stipulate reimbursement of incurred
training-costs were the worker to separate before some pre-specified minimum service pe-
riod. Tuition reimbursement programs have experience a surge in popularity in recent years,
and are estimated to be offered by as much as 85% of US firms (Manchester, 2007; Capelli,
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2004). Despite this, there are no – at least not to the author’s knowledge – theoretical
studies investigating the implications of such programs on human capital accumulation.
As most provided training is of a general character, it is quite straightforward to incorpo-
rate the ideas of tuition reimbursement programs into the present framework. Most notably,
repayment clauses dictate that in case of separation the worker incurs cost c(τ), which then
accrues to the employer. However, while court-cases reveal that repayment clauses can be,
and commonly are, legitimately enforced, it is unclear whether this applies only to voluntary
quits or also includes the situation of exogenous separations (see Kraus (2008), Section 5,
for a detailed discussion of a number judicial precedents).28 I will therefore consider both
possibilities.
With a legally enforceable repayment clause, a worker’s outside option is now given by
v(τ) = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)−∆ (12)
In accordance with the definition in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a), as f ′(τ) > v′(τ) the
external wage-structure is compressed. Following a Nash-bargaining protocol, it is also easy
to see that w(τ) = v(τ) + α∆, where α is the worker’s bargaining power and ∆ the sur-
plus of the relationship. As a consequence, the internal wage structure is also compressed.
Yet, firm-sponsored training does not emerge naturally. To see this, appropriately modi-
fying equation (2) in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) to incorporate the ideas of a tuition
reimbursement program yields
(1− q)c′(τ) = c′(τ)
where it is assumed that repayment only occurs at voluntary separation. Clearly, optimal
training equals zero.
On the other hand, however, if repayment also occurs at exogenous separations, the
associated first-order condition is instead
(1− q)c′(τ) + qc′(τ) = c′(τ)
and training is indeterminate. The reason behind these results is not far-fetched. With
tuition reimbursement programs, the previously sunk-cost of training is instead intertem-
porally shifted and levied on the worker in case of separation. As this affects bargaining,
the worker will not only receive all the benefits associated training, but also, through a
28For instance, Kraus (2008) states: “Several decisions have held that agreements by an employee to
repay training costs, if the employee leaves before a specified period, do not alter either the company’s right
to discharge the employee at will, or the employee’s obligation to repay after such a termination.” Yet in
another case, a pilot whose aircraft was taken out of service for prolonged maintenance left for another
employer. The court concluded that his departure was a “constructive discharge” excusing any ongoing
obligation to repay the costs of training.
20 PONTUS RENDAHL
reduction in (future) pay, bear all of its costs. Thus, if repayment occurs in all states of the
world, the firm is left indifferent between training a worker or not. However if, on the other
hand, repayment is conditional on voluntary quits only, the firm will, in expectation, bear
some of the cost, but reap none of the rewards. As a consequence, optimal training, in this
case, is zero.
To economize on notation, let d be an indicator variable assuming d = 1 if repayment
also occurs at exogenous separations, and d = 0 if not. Conditional on having entered the
market, a training-firm’s problem under a tuition reimbursement program is given by
pi(V ) = max
w,τ≥0
{(1− q)(f(τ)− w + βk)− c(τ) + q(k + dc(τ))} (13)
s.t. V ≤(1− q)w + q(f(τ)− dc(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (14)
w ≥f(τ)− c(τ)− (1− β)k −∆ (15)
We then have the following results.
Proposition 5. If d = 0 there exist a unique equilibrium with training
(i) c(τ) = (1−q)q ∆, if c(τ
∗) ≥ (1−q)q ∆,
(ii) τ = τ∗, if c(τ∗) ≤ (1−q)q ∆,
(iii) and τ = τ∗ if q = 0, for all ∆ ≥ 0.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Proposition 6. If d = 1 there exist a unique equilibrium with training
(i) τ = τ∗, for all ∆ > 0.
(ii) For ∆ = 0 there are multiple equilibria with τ ∈ [0, τ∗].
Proof. In Appendix A. 
The intuition underlying Proposition 5 is straightforward. The repayment clause ef-
fectively reduces a worker’s outside option by c(τ). As a consequence, a firm’s ex post
quasi-rent must, at a maximum, equal c(τ) + ∆. In equilibrium, ex ante costs coincide with
expected ex post quasi-rents, and c(τ) ≤ (1−q)(c(τ)+∆).29 Therefore, either training solves
c(τ) = (1−q)q ∆ – and renegotiation is imminent – or training reaches the social optimum, at
which c(τ∗) ≤ (1−q)q ∆. Repayment clauses therefore increases the amount of training likely
to be observed.
In contrast to Proposition 5, however, Proposition 6 merits a deeper discussion. Follow-
ing the intuition of Proposition 1, when renegotiation is not a binding concern the firm’s
29With equality if and only if renegotiation is imminent.
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objective function is strictly increasing on τ ∈ [0, τ∗). As a consequence a firm will unam-
biguously train up until min{τ¯ , τ∗}. In marked difference to the previous logic, however,
whenever renegotiations are imminent, the optimal level of training is instead indetermi-
nate. To see this, substituting the poaching constraint (15) into the firm’s objective function
yields
pi(V ) = k + (1− q)∆ (16)
which is independent of training. The reason is that workers, and not firms, are not only
the sole residual claimant to any marginal benefits, but also assume all marginal costs. The
firm’s marginal gain to training beyond the renegotiation-point is nil.
Nonetheless, whenever ∆ is strictly positive, equation (16) also reveals that profits al-
ways exceed k, suggesting that renegotiation can never be a concern in equilibrium. The
equilibrium contract must therefore assume a sufficiently generous value which assures that
training reaches the social optimum and that renegotiations are far from impending.
In contrast to this reasoning, however, if ∆ instead equals zero, profits equal k at any
level of training. Thus, while contract V = f(0)− (1− β)k, for instance, is an equilibrium
contract with associated training τ = 0, so is contract V = f(τ∗) − c(τ∗) − (1 − β)k with
training τ∗. The entire set of possible equilibria is therefore straightforwardly given by
V = f(τ)− c(τ)− (1− β)k, with τ ∈ [0, τ∗].
Despite this tremendous degree of multiplicity, some equilibria appear more reasonable
than others. In particular, suppose that V is a specific equilibrium outcome with associated
training τ which falls short of the social optimum τ∗. Then there is nothing which prevents
an individual firm from offering a contract Vˆ > V with associated training τˆ > τ , with
unaltered profits.30 As a consequence, I find it difficult to imagine reasons as to why an
individual firm and worker could not agree on such an obvious Pareto-improving policy,
leaving the social optimum, in fact, the only reasonable and therefore uniquely determined
equilibrium.
Admittedly, however, the contract in Proposition 6 is quite elaborate. Not only does it
stipulate a specific wage, but also a certain training level as well as a repayment clause
detailing the monetary transaction in case of separation. Yet, most tuition reimbursement
programs are of a voluntary nature and made readily available to all employees, including
past hires. Quite surprisingly, however, the results in Proposition 6 do not hinge on the
contractibility of training. Recall from the discussion in Section 3.1 that wage-contracts
alone fail to internalize the separation externality, impeding training beyond the constrained
efficient level, τˆ∗. More precisely, the separation externality instills a wedge between the
30Notice, though, that the reverse is not true: No individual firm may offer some contract Vˆ < V and
still remain in business.
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private and social returns to training, compelling equilibrium training to, at the very most,
satisfy (1 − q)f ′(τˆ∗) = c′(τˆ∗). However, while the separation externality bounds marginal
returns to not exceed (1−q)f ′(τ), the repayment clause bounds marginal costs not to exceed
(1 − q)c′(τ). As a consequence, in the absence of renegotiation – and, more importantly,
in the absence of contractible human capital investments – a firm’s first order condition
with respect to training observes (1 − q)f ′(τ) = (1 − q)c′(τ), ensuring a socially desirable
outcome. These ideas are summarized in Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1. Suppose that a contract, V , takes the form of a wage. Then the results in
Proposition 6 are unaltered.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
4. Discussion
The model analyzed in the preceding sections provides a novel view on firms’ incentives
to invest in training. However, while the interactions that underpin the main mechanisms
are original to this study, the individual components are, to a large extent, not. It therefore
appears appropriate to discuss the implications of the model’s main building-blocks, and
to relate them to the relevant theoretical literature. In addition, empirical predictions are
discussed and put in context with existing applied work. The main equilibrium implications,
I argue, are largely supported by the data.
4.1. Theoretical literature. A hold-up problem arises when parts – or all – of the returns
on an agent’s relation-specific investments are ex post expropriable by her trading partner.
More precisely, when ex ante costs are entirely absorbed by the investing party and when
contractual incompleteness infer ex post bargaining over gross returns, investments are
typically left inefficiently low (Grout, 1984; Williamson, 1975). The ideas underpinning a
hold-up are intimately related to those of firm-sponsored investments in human capital:
Firms devote time and resources towards employee training, absorbing the entire associated
cost. As training expenses are sunk at later stages of the production process, ex post
bargaining falls short of efficiently assigning residual rents, and training therefore falls well
below the social optimum.
When training is of a general character, however, the problem of a hold-up is further
exacerbated. As the accumulation of skills is vested in the worker, and not the firm, any
resulting improvement of a worker’s marginal product is immediately, and in equal propor-
tion, reflected in her outside option. As a consequence, ex post – or gross – surplus is left
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unaffected, leaving the firm bearing all associated costs, but reaping none of the associ-
ated rewards. Indeed, the Beckarian poaching externality is thoroughly isomorphic to this
exasperated version of the hold-up problem.
The theoretical literature on hold-ups has suggested several ingenious and empirically rel-
evant solutions to the problem. Notably, Klein et al. (1978) and Grossman and Hart (1986)
argue that the problem of hold-ups may explain the emergence of vertical integrations,
and ultimately substantiate a theory of the firm (Williamson, 1985). Legal considerations,
such as at-will employment, however, prevents analogous organizational solutions within
firm-worker relationships, and can therefore not comprise the foundation of a theory of
firm-sponsored investments in general training.31
Another prominent solution suggested in the literature is the use of fixed price contracts
(Chung, 1991; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). Whereas the murky nature of investments
may obstruct enforcement of complete contracts assigning residual rents in all states of
the world, a simpler contract which stipulates a fixed transaction-price appears a more
unassuming premise.32 The mechanism is quite intuitive. When investments improves the
valuation of a good to one of the participating agents, a fixed price of transaction ensures
that all residual rents will accrue to the very same party.33 Thus, absent renegotiations, a
firm investing in a worker’s skills under this assertion will therefore reap the full residual
benefits, leading to an efficient allocation of human capital.
Despite these lucid arguments, however, the general nature of human capital adds some
additional layers of complexity to the analysis. Most importantly, as investment in general
skills not only improves a worker’s marginal product, but also her attractiveness to com-
peting employers, renegotiations may naturally emerge. Given a certain contract, this is a
particularly acute concern if a worker wishes to exercise her right to terminate the employ-
ment relation. Thus, while fixed price contracts can largely circumvent the issues concerning
hold-ups, the looming threat of renegotiations in the current setting brings the problem back
at full force. As a consequence, a theory of firm-sponsored training is incomplete without
31In a related study Hart and Moore (1990) show how the allocation of asset-ownership may mitigate, and
even circumvent, the problem of hold-ups. However as the “asset” is defined the object to which investments
are directed, and “asset-ownership” as the legal right to put that asset into use elsewhere, an analogous
solution is not applicable in the case of employee training.
32Implicitly, the use fixed price contracts presumes that trade is observable by a third-party enforcer (e.g.
courts of law).
33This type of investments is usually referred to as “self-investments”. See Che and Hausch (1999) for
detailed discussion of “cooperative investments”.
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the addition of an integrated theory of renegotiations. And as previously argued, renegoti-
ations by mutual consent provides a plausible departure point in order to characterize the
process of reformulating previously agreed contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993).
However, with renegotiations at the heart of the analysis, the mere level of prices – which
largely governs the point of renegotiations – turn into an integral part of the analysis. Here,
the works of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and others, are moot. To fill this gap, I have
considered a competitive equilibrium in which the resulting prices direct the entry of firms
in order to clear the labor market.
4.2. Empirical relevance. While the empirical literature on firm-sponsored training is
large, there are several econometric concerns that limit the scope of accurately identify-
ing causal mechanisms. Human capital is, almost by definition, unobservable; data on
worker productivity is scarce and sometimes unobtainable; rejected outside offers are rarely
recorded; mobility costs are plausibly worker-specific or may well be intertwined with al-
ternative match-specific components such as firm-specific human capital; and the decision
to invest – or to accept training – is almost surely endogenous and depends on the em-
ployer’s perception of several industry-, firm-, or worker-characteristics which may well be
unobserved to the econometrician. As a consequence, the empirical literature is largely
constrained to confine attention towards equilibrium implications in order to disentangle
which theory is more or less consistent with that observed in the data.
Under the hypotheses laid out in this study, equilibrium training ought to be intimately
and positively related to both mobility-costs, ∆, and to the retention-rate, 1 − q. Using
establishment-level data in the United States, Frazis et al. (2000) find turnover to have a
negative effect on some (but not all) of their measures of training. Booth et al. (1999) show
that the higher the average quit-rate in a British industry, the less likely is a full-time male
employed in the industry to receive general training, and the fewer are the training days, if
trained.
In addition, Muehlemann and Wolter (forthcoming) find that Swiss firms are less likely to
provide apprenticeship training in dense regional labor markets, where the probability that
workers are poached by other firms are higher. Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) find that
in the United Kingdom, firm-sponsored training is less frequent in areas with higher local
employment density, and Brunello and Paola (2008) provide further corroborating evidence
for the case of Italy. In their seminal paper, Harhoff and Kane (1995) use data from the
Mannheim Innovation Panel and show that firms are more willing to offer firm-sponsored
training when there are only a few firms geographically around to poach their apprentices.
Lastly, van Ours and Picchio (forthcoming) find that a decrease in labor market frictions
significantly reduces firms’ training expenditures in the Netherlands.
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A further commonly explored equilibrium implication deriving from theoretical models of
training concerns the resulting wage structure. More precisely, a worker’s tenure premium
is defined as the additional wage increase that workers staying with their initial employers
receive compared to those who leave. While the premium is unambiguously positive under
the hypothesis laid out in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a), it is like to be negative in
the current setting.34 To see this, assume that ∆ is comprised by two components ∆m+∆f .
The component ∆m refers to a direct cost to the worker of relocating, while ∆f denotes
some firm- or match-specific component to productivity. The tenure premium is then given
by
TP = ∆f − c(τ)
1− q (17)
Thus, following Proposition 1, if c(τ∗) weakly exceeds expected rents, (1− q)∆, the tenure
premium equals the negative of ∆m which, under quite plausible assumptions, is positive,
rendering a negative tenure premium. However, whenever c(τ∗) falls short of (1− q)∆ the
tenure premium may instead be positive depending on the relative magnitude of ∆m and
∆f . But a likely negative value appears a reasonable departure point.
In their study on the German apprenticeship system, Harhoff and Kane (1995) conclude
that workers who remain with the training firm earn less than those who leave, suggesting
that the tenure premium for previously trained workers indeed is negative. Clark (2001)
construct a rich longitudinal data set which allows for a comparison between quits and
layoffs among German apprentices, and confirm the prior results by Harhoff and Kane
(1995). Using recent training data from the British Household Panel Survey, Booth and
Bryan (2005) conclude that employer financed training raises wages both at present-, but
foremost at future employers, and that the effect is the largest for training conducted at
accredited institutions.35 Finally, and as mentioned in the introduction, Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1998) find similar results in the United States, Goux and Maurin (2000) in France,
and Gerfin (2004) in Switzerland.36 Moreover, in an interesting test of sensitivity, Gerfin
(2004) finds that the negative tenure premium is further augmented when small firms are
left out of the sample. While the mechanism behind this result is largely unknown, Gerfin
34Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) pp. 549-550.
35Indeed, Booth and Bryan (2005) argue that their results are consistent with a situation in which firms
offer credit constrained workers training which is then “repaid” through wages below the worker’s marginal
product at later stages of the relationship.
36In sharp contrast, however, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) find that only exogenous “quitters” (due to
mandatory military service) have a negative tenure premium, while it is positive for workers who quit for
endogenous reasons. Nevertheless, the estimated positive tenure premium is not very precise, and is not
statistically different from zero.
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hypothesize that large firms are more credible in offering long-term contracts and may
extract rents from previously trained worker by paying a wage below marginal product.
4.3. Policy Implications. With respect to policy, the ideas hypothesized in this paper
support markedly different actions than those from previous studies. To see this, notice
that as the main mechanism underlying a theory of wage-compression concerns marginal
gains versus marginal costs, only marginal remedies are viable policy options. As a conse-
quence, non-contractible subsidies have no effect on the provision of training, and translate
instead to a direct windfall gain to targeted firms (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b). Conse-
quently, Acemoglu and Pischke suggest regulation of training as a prioritized objective, as
it would not only facilitate contractual arrangements between subsidies and training, but
also remove the credibility issues surrounding training between the worker and the firm.37
While regulation would indeed facilitate contractual performance between the worker and
the firm also in the present setting (cf. Propositions 1, 2 and 3), it is by no means necessary
from a policy point of view. Indeed, a lump-sum subsidy directed towards a training-firm,
or a lump-sum tax levied on non-training firms, would induce an identical outcome to that
of a larger match-specific component, ∆. These ideas are summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. A socially optimal level of training, τ∗, can be attained by a lump-sum
(non-contractable) subsidy to training-firms, or by a lump-sum tax levied on non-training
firms.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
The arguments underlying Proposition 7 are quite intuitive in light of the previous anal-
ysis. Given a certain contract, V , an unconditional subsidy unambiguously improves a
training-firm’s profits to exceed k. As a consequence, market forces put upward pressure
on the price of labor, leaving additional room for training absent the imminent threat of
renegotiations. As the increase in training improves workers’ productivity further, profits
again exceed k, putting additional pressure on wages, leaving even more room for training,
and so on. The final effect on equilibrium human capital acquisition may straightforwardly
be visualized in Figure 2: A training subsidy yields an upward shift of equal magnitude in
the parabola tracing out the zero-profit condition. Obviously, at a sufficiently large subsidy,
the new equilibrium level of training must correspond to the social optimum. With respect
to taxes on non-training firms, on the other hand, the equilibrium can instead be visualized
37Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) argue that contractable training may induce workers to accept a wage-
concession early in the employment relation, and therefore (indirectly) finance their own investment in
general human capital.
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as an outward shift of the monotonically increasing renegotiation-curve. The final effect is,
of course, qualitatively similar
Arguably, considering the intangible nature of training, the presence of non-contractable
subsidies appears a more realistic de facto working hypothesis, and the ideas underpinning
Proposition 7 indeed find some support in the data. Holzer et al. (1993) investigate whether
training grants under the Michigan Job Opportunity Bank-Upgrade actually increase firm-
provided training, or if they merely translate to a windfall gain to firms already providing
some training. While perhaps indicative at most, they find that grants substantially, but
temporarily, increase firms’ training provisions, have a long lasting positive effect on workers’
productivity, and does not constitute a mere windfall benefit to training firms.
5. Conclusions
This paper has studied a model of firm-sponsored investments in general human capital
in which firms’ ability to credibly offer long-term contracts and the competitive nature of
markets play a pivotal role in shaping the provision of training. As contracts are renegotiated
by mutual consent, firms’ quasi-rents are increasing in training, providing solid incentives for
firms to finance investments in workers’ general skills. The competitive nature of markets
ensure that firms do not earn excess profits, disciplining contracts to equate ex post quasi-
rents with ex ante costs. As rents intimately relate to any match-specific component of
productivity – e.g. firm-specific human capital, or mobility costs – so does the equilibrium
level of training. As a consequence, equilibrium investments in general skills stand in direct
parity to the money metric extent of which worker’s are tied to their current employer, or
more simply; to their mobility cost.
The model infers a number of verifiable, and often verified, predictions. Consistent with
several empirical studies – and common to other theories on firm-sponsored training – ob-
served investments in human capital ought to be negatively related to turnover, as separa-
tions impair future profits which themselves pertain to training. Perhaps more interestingly,
however, the model suggests that training should intimately relate to any component which
permit firms to extract quasi-rents from their employees. Indeed, several empirical studies
document that investments in general human capital appears to be more generous, and
more frequent, in areas where the geographical density of competing employers is low.
From a policy perspective, the present study yields some novel insights. In particular,
the elusive nature of human capital often deems training a non-contractible investment.
As a consequence, previous theoretical studies have cast some doubt on the usefulness of
government subsidies, as these are unlikely to improve the marginal rewards to training. In
contrast, the arguments put forward in this paper suggests that even grants of a lump-sum
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nature may well improve the allocation of human capital, as they increase ex post profits
and ultimately the provision of training.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2. Conditional on a certain choice of τ , a necessary and sufficient condition
for optimal wage-setting is given by
w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆}
As a consequence, the objective function is strictly increasing on τ ∈ [0,min{τ¯ , τˆ∗}) – where τ¯ is defined as
V = f(τ¯)− (1−β)k−∆, and τˆ∗ solves (8) – and strictly decreasing thereafter. Optimal training is therefore
given by min{τ¯ , τˆ∗}. Optimal wage-setting combined with the optimal choice of training reveals that wages
satisfy w = V .
In equilibrium, however, firms make profits k, and V must therefore satisfy
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)
1− q (A1)
Inserting the equilibrium V into the wage-setting equation yields
w = max{f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)
1− q , f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆}
Combining the equation above with the optimal choice of training implies that if c(τˆ∗) ≥ (1 − q)∆, the
unique equilibrium is given by c(τ) = (1− q)∆. And if c(τˆ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆, the unique equilibrium is given by
τ = τˆ∗.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3. A non-defecting firm’s total profits are given by
k =
1
1− β (f(τ)− c(τ)− q∆− V ) (A2)
where τ simply refers to a firm’s equilibrium training level, and V the equilibrium contract.
A defected firm has lost her reputation of committing to training. She must therefore pay wages wˆ which
are given by
(1− q)wˆ = V − q(f(τˆ)− (1− β)k −∆) ≥ (1− q)w (A3)
where τˆ refers to the firm’s optimal training level, given that no other firm has defected. The training level τˆ
coincides with the results in Proposition 2. It should therefore be noted that if c(τˆ∗) ≥ (1− q)∆, a defecting
firm behaves no differently from a non-defecting firm, and reputations are redundant. Thus the relevant
scenario to have in mind is given by the situation at which c(τˆ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆, and τˆ = τˆ∗. As a consequence,
the inequality in (A3) is strict if and only if τ 6= τˆ .
In addition, if a defected firm were to exogenously separate, her profits are given by (1−β)k+βkˆ, where
kˆ refers to her continuation profits. A defected firm’s total profits are therefore given by
kˆ =
1
1− β (f(τˆ)− c(τˆ)− q∆− V ) (A4)
Combining equations (A2) and (A4) yields
k − kˆ = 1
1− β (f(τ)− f(τˆ)− (c(τ)− c(τˆ))) ≥ 0 (A5)
with strict inequality if and only if τ 6= τˆ .
The profits of a defecting firm is then given by
ˆˆ
k = (1− q)f(τˆ) + qf(τ)− c(τˆ)− q∆− V + βkˆ
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Hence
k − ˆˆk = (1− q)(f(τ)− f(τˆ))− (c(τ)− c(τˆ)) + β(k − kˆ)
Inserting (A5) yields
k − ˆˆk = (1− q)(f(τ)− f(τˆ))− (c(τ)− c(τˆ)) + β
1− β (f(τ)− f(τˆ)− (c(τ)− c(τˆ)))
Clearly, if τ 6= τˆ and β → 1, (k − ˆˆk)→∞, and the value of defecting approaches minus infinity.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4. Conditional on a certain choice of τ , optimal wage-setting and investment
in firm-specific human capital are given by
(1− q)w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆} − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (A6)
s =
argmax{(1− q)f(s+ τ)− c(s+ τ)} if τ ≤ s
∗;
0 elsewhere.
(A7)
The objective function of the firm is, again, strictly increasing in τ on [0,min{τ¯ , τ∗}), and decreasing
thereafter. Therefore, the optimal level of general training is given by τ = min{τ¯ , τ∗}.
An equilibrium contract must satisfy
V = qf(τ) + (1− q)f(τ + s)− c(τ + s)− (1− β)k − q∆ (A8)
Inserting into the wage-setting equation yields
(1− q)w = max{qf(τ) + (1− q)f(τ + s)− c(τ + s)− (1− β)k − q∆, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆}
− q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (A9)
First, it is important to notice that at τ = 0, the left-hand side of the max operator exceeds the right-hand
side, as (1− q)f(s∗)− c(s∗) > (1− q)f(0).
If (1− q)∆ < c(s∗), the left- and the right-hand side has a unique crossing point given by (1− q)f(τ)−
(1− q)∆ = (1− q)f(s∗)− c(s∗), with τ < s∗. As a consequence, s = s∗ − τ .
If c(τ∗) > (1− q)∆ ≥ c(s∗), the left- and the right-hand side of the max operator has a unique crossing
point given by c(τ) = ∆(1− q), with τ ≥ s∗. As a consequence, s = 0.
Lastly, if c(τ∗) ≤ (1− q)∆, there exist no crossing point for τ ≤ τ∗, and investments in general training
must therefore equal τ∗. As τ∗ > s∗, the optimal level of firm-specific human capital equals, again, zero.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 5. Rearranging constraint (14) under the hypothesis that d = 0 yields
(1− q)w ≥ V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
Conditional on a certain choice of τ , a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal wage-setting is therefore
given by
(1− q)w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− (1− q)c(τ)} − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆) (A10)
As a consequence, the objective function is strictly increasing on τ ∈ [0,min{τ¯ , τ∗}) – where τ¯ is defined as
V = f(τ) − (1 − β)k − ∆ − (1 − q)c(τ) – and strictly decreasing thereafter. Optimal training is therefore
given by min{τ¯ , τ∗}. Optimal wage-setting combined with the optimal choice of training reveals that wages
satisfy
(1− q)w = V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
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In equilibrium, however, firms make profits k, and V must therefore satisfy
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆ (A11)
That is, as previously, the optimal level of training depends on the contract, V , and the equilibrium level of
V depend on the optimal level of training.
Inserting the equilibrium V in equation (A11) into the wage-setting equation (A10) yields
(1− q)w = max{f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− (1− q)c(τ)}
− q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
Combining the equation above with the optimal choice of training implies that if c(τ∗) ≥ (1−q)
q
∆, the unique
equilibrium is given by c(τ) = (1−q)
q
∆. And if c(τ∗) ≤ (1−q)
q
∆, the unique equilibrium is given by τ = τ∗.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 6. Rearranging constraint (14) under the hypothesis that d = 1 yields
(1− q)w ≥ V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ))
Conditional on a certain choice of τ , a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal wage-setting is therefore
given by
(1− q)w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ)} − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ)) (A12)
As a consequence, the objective function is strictly increasing on τ ∈ [0,min{τ¯ , τ∗}) – where τ¯ is defined as
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k−∆− c(τ) –, flat until τ = τ∗, and decreasing thereafter. Optimal training is therefore
given by the interval [τ¯ , τ∗]. Optimal wage-setting combined with the optimal choice of training reveals that
wages satisfy
(1− q)w = V − q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ))
In equilibrium, however, firms make profits k, and V must therefore satisfy
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆ (A13)
Inserting the equilibrium V in equation (A13) into the wage-setting equation (A12) yields
(1− q)w = max{f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ)}
− q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆)
However, as f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ)− q∆ > f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ) for any ∆ > 0, τ must always equal
τ∗ in equilibrium.
If ∆ = 0, there are multiple equilibria in which τ ∈ [0, τ∗].
A.6. Proof of Proposition 7. The firm’s optimization problem is now given by
pi(V ) = max
w,τ≥0
{(1− q)(f(τ)− w + b+ βk)− c(τ) + qk}
s.t. V ≤ (1− q)w + q(f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− t)
w ≥ f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− t
where b is a subsidy given to a training firm while t is a tax imposed on a non-training firm. Repeating the
same steps as in Proposition 1 reveals that the policy b and t must satisfy
(1− q)(∆ + t+ b) ≥ c(τ∗)
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If the government is further assumed to run a balanced budget, we have
qt = (1− q)b
Thus, a tax, t, such that
t = c(τ∗)− (1− q)∆
would induce Pareto-optimal training.
A.7. Proof of Corollary 1. If firms cannot commit to a value, optimal wage-setting yields
w = max{V, f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ)} (A14)
The firm’s objective function is therefore strictly increasing on [0,min{τ¯ , τ∗}] and decreasing thereafter.
In equilibrium firms make profits k, and V must therefore satisfy
V = f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ) (A15)
Inserting the equilibrium V in equation (A15) into the wage-setting equation (A14) yields
w = max{f(τ)− (1− β)k − c(τ), f(τ)− (1− β)k −∆− c(τ)}
Hence, if ∆ > 0, the unique equilibrium is given by τ = τ∗. If ∆ = 0, the equilibrium is indeterminate
and τ ∈ [0, τ∗].
